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Comments
Mandatory Retirement of Airline Pilots: An Analysis
of the FAA's Age 60 Retirement Rule
Under current Federal Aviation Regulation 121.383(c), 1 the "Age
60 Rule," an airline pilot, at the age of 60, must discontinue flying air-
craft used to carry passengers in airline operations. Thus, an airline
pilot who reaches the age of 60 must retire without regard to his or her
excellent health and continued ability to fly.
The tension caused by this conflict between the Age 60 Rule and
an individual pilot's continuing desire and ability to fly is shown by the
last flight prior to retirement of Captain Gene Hersche. 2 During take-
off, the aircraft Captain Hersche was piloting experienced serious diffi-
culties. 3 Hersche reacted promptly" to the emergency and reduced the
severity of the accident. 5 Due to Captain Hersche's prompt reactions
and skill, all but two of the plane's occupants survived the accident.6
Captain Hersche was retired immediately after the accident because
this flight was his last flight before reaching the mandatory retirement
age of 60.7
The Age 60 Rule (the Rule) has been in effect, in various forms,
since 1960.8 It has been the focus of congressional scrutiny,9 as well as
numerous lawsuits' 0 and law review articles."I This Comment explores
1. Airman: Limitations on Use of Services, 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1980).
2. To Eliminate Age Limitations Presento Imposed on Certain Pilots of Aircraft." Hear-
ings on H.R 3948 Before the Subcomm. on 4viation ofthe House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1979) (statement of Capt. Sam Enfield) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Aviation Hearings].
3. The difficulties included a near simultaneous blowout of two tires, id at 76, fol-
lowed by the failure of a third tire and the malfunction of the braking system. Id at 167.
4. Id at 76. It was determined from the aircraft's flight data recorder (the so-called
"black box") that Capt. Hersche reacted within 1.2 seconds.
5. Id
6. Two passengers lost their lives because, contrary to instructions, they took the
wrong direction after leaving the aircraft and died of burns and smoke inhalation. Id at
107.
7. Id at 170.
8. 24 Fed. Reg. 9768-69 (1959) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 40.260(b)).
9. SeeAviation Hearings, supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., Keating v. FAA, 610 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1979); Rombough v. FAA, 594
F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1979); Gray v. FAA, 594 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1979); Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d
307 (7th Cir. 1978); O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Air Line Pilots
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various aspects of the application of the Rule to pilots flying aircraft for
commercial airlines.' 2 It outlines the history of the Rule, beginning
prior to the Rule's conception with the forced retirement of pilots pur-
suant to their employment contracts and ending with the Rule's pro-
mulgation and its subsequent administrative reviews. The Comment
then examines the judicial treatment of legal challenges to the Rule,
and the legislative attempts to change the Rule. Finally, the Comment
suggests the revocation of the Rule in light of advances in medical and
aeronautical technology.
Development of the Age 60 Retirement Rule
The aviation industry has been subject to federal safety regulations
since the 1930's. 13 These regulations were promulgated by the Civil
Aeronautics Authority (CAA), the predecessor to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), to protect pilots and the traveling public. 14 Al-
though the CAA had various regulations pertaining to the physical
well-being and flight proficiency of pilots, 15 it had no regulations that
prohibited a pilot from flying beyond a certain age. 16 This was because
the pilot's age was not considered relevant to flight safety.' 7
Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1960); Monroe v.
United Air Lines, Inc., No. 79C360 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1979).
11. See, e.g., Bergman, Age Discrimination in Employment.- Air Carriers, 36 J. AIR. L. &
COM. 3 (1970); Ruppenthal, Compulsory Retirement of Air Line Pilots, 14 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 528 (1961); Note, The Constitutionality of the Mandatory Retirement Age, 5 U.
SAN. FERN. V.L. REV. 303 (1976).
12. The regulations provide for a number of different pilot licenses. See 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.5 (1980). Additionally, there are three general classifications of aircraft operations:
general aviation, air carrier, and military. Each of these areas may be further divided. Spe-
cifically, air carrier operations include air taxi, commuter, air cargo, and commercial air-
lines. This Note deals only with commercial airline pilots.
13. Ruppenthal, Compulsory Retirement ofAir Line Pilots, 14 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
528, 528 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Ruppenthal].
14. Id.
15. Id Until 1961, regulations required airline pilots to take proficiency checks at least
every twelve months. 14 C.F.R. § 40.289 (1946). In 1961, the rules changed to require profi-
ciency checks every six months. 14 C.F.R. § 40.303 (1961). Medical examinations were re-
quired every six months. 14 C.F.R. § 21.40(b) (1956).
16. The lack of regulations pertaining to a maximum age limitation was equally true
for non-air carrier pilots, including charter, general aviation, and helicopter pilots. For
these pilots, there have been no age limitation rules promulgated. Thus, only air carrier
pilots currently are subject to any maximum age limit. But cf. Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co.,
490 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (although the court noted that the Age 60 Rule does not
apply to corporate pilots, the FAA rule was used as evidence that a private regulation was
reasonable).
17. In 1936, for example, the Air Line Pilots Association concluded that "retirement of
airline pilots should be based on physical and mental condition only and not by any age
limitations." Age Discrimination Against Airline Pilots.- Hearings Before the Select Comm. on
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Contractual Development of Age-based Retirement
Prior to 1940, airline contracts did not have age-based mandatory
retirement provisions. Most pilots were young; physical and flight pro-
ficiency requirements provided adequate safety margins.' 8
In the 1940's, however, the airlines initiated pension plans. Under
these plans, forced retirement and pension eligibility were predicated
on age. 19 The carriers took the position that retirement plans and pen-
sions were not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.20 Thus,
many carriers unilaterally set 60 as the age at which forced retirement
of pilots would occur.2' Until the mid-1950's, airlines retired pilots
pursuant to retirement provisions of these pension plans.22 Although
perhaps reluctant to retire, pilots did not challenge the provisions.23
In 1957, grievances were filed by three American Airlines Pilots
who had been forced to retire.24 The pilots alleged that retirement ter-
minated their seniority rights and that, under their collective bargain-
ing agreement, this manner of termination was not one of the three
stipulated ways by which seniority could be lost.25 The American Air-
line System Board of Adjustment ultimately found that the company
had violated its contract with the pilots,2 6 noting that neither the Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA) nor American Airlines had evidenced
an intention to include in the collective bargaining agreement the at-
tainment of age 60 as a circumstance by which to interrupt seniority. 27
The Board of Adjustment ruled that forced retirement at the age of 60
was therefore a violation of the pilots' contract, and ordered American
Airlines to return the pilots to flight status if they satisfied the standard
Aging, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 84 (1979) (statement of Capt. John J. O'Donnell) [hereinafter
cited as Airline Age Discrimination].
18. Ruppenthal, supra note 13, at 529.
19. Id
20. Id
21. Id at 533.
22. In 1950, Captain W.H. Proctor, a pilot for American Airlines, became one of the
first airline pilots to reach a company-imposed retirement age of 60. Id at 530.
23. Id
24. AirlineAge Discrimination, supra note 17, at 85. The pilots and the Air Line Pilots
Association (ALPA) fled the grievances with the American Airlines System Board of Ad-
justment, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The Board of Adjustment was a
grievance board composed of four members and a neutral referee who heard employment
disputes between pilots and the company. Ruppenthal, supra note 13, at 530-31.
The ALPA is an organization representing over 30,000 airline pilots. The ALPA acts as
the pilots' collective bargaining agent and as their legislative lobbyist with regard to matters
such as the Age 60 Rule. Aviation Hearings, supra note 2, at 335.
25. Ruppenthal, supra note 13 at 531. Seniority could be lost by resignation, discharge,
or failure to return from furlough within specified time limits. Id
26. Id.
27. Id
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physical and proficiency requirements.28 In subsequent cases, griev-
ance boards consistently denounced age-based mandatory retirement
and held that retirement should be based solely upon physical and
flight proficiency standards. 29
Regulatory Developments
Despite the resistance of pilots and the ALPA to age-based
mandatory retirement, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rule
Making in 1959,30 in which the FAA indicated its intention to establish
a maximum age for all air carrier pilots. 31 The FAA's proposal was
that no person who had reached the age of 60 should serve as a pilot on
any aircraft engaged in air carrier operations. 32 The FAA suggested
four reasons why a maximum age limitation was needed to ensure avia-
tion safety. First, the process of aging involves a "progressive deterio-
ration of certain important physiological and psychological
functions," 33 resulting largely from the degenerative process of arterio-
sclerosis.34 Second, the effect of the aging process cannot be deter-
28. Id. Despite the Board of Adjustment's decision, American Airlines refused to com-
ply. Id. at 533. This refusal became an issue in a pilot strike against American Airlines
shortly after the Board's decision and, as a part of the strike settlement, American Airlines
agreed to comply with the arbitration order. Id
29. Id. In 1959, Western Airlines became involved in a similar complaint filed by one
of its 60-year-old pilots. The carrier argued that the critical issue was one of safety, and as
such was not properly a subject for the grievance machinery in effect at Western Airlines.
Alternatively, Western Airlines argued that safety was so critical that any adverse effects the
pursuit of safety had on working conditions were merely incidental. Id The majority of the
arbitration board, after hearing testimony about age and its relationship to safety, stated
that, "there is no testimonial basis and no 'fact of life' of which we could be expected to take
a kind of 'judicial notice' that supports the view that it is unsafe to let a pilot perform after
the age of 60. This is not to say that there is not some age-say 90-when we would take
judicial notice of physical impairment beyond all reason. It is enough to say that the evi-
dence here does not support the theory that attainment of age 60 is in itself enough to dis-
qualify a pilot." id at 535.
30. 24 Fed. Reg. 5247 (1959).
31. There is some indication that the FAA, under the guidance of its new Administra-
tor, General Elwood R. Quesada, was under pressure to demonstrate that the FAA was
doing its job. Since the beginning of his term in 1958, more people had died than ever
before in aviation history, and the first civilian mid-air collision had occurred. "It was nec-
essary for Mr. Quesada to make some kind of move to placate the public so he decided to
prove that he was on the job by pointing his finger at the older pilots." Letter from Capt.
L.E. Wagner to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (April 25, 1960), reprinted in 106 CONG. REC.
9962 (1960).
32. 24 Fed. Reg. 5248 (1959). The initially proposed regulation was significantly
broader in scope than the one adopted. In the initially proposed regulation, the FAA had
submitted a maximum age beyond which a pilot could not transfer to piloting a turbo-jet
powered aircraft. Compare 24 Fed. Reg. 9768-69 (1959) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R.
§ 40.260(b)) with 24 Fed. Reg. 5248 (1959).
33. 24 Fed. Reg. 5247 (1959).
34. Id. Arteriosclerosis is a generic term and includes a number of diseases of the
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mined on an individual basis because each person is affected by the
aging process to different degrees at the same point in life.35 Third,
degeneration as a result of the aging process occurs at a faster rate the
older one becomes. 36 Finally, the result of age degeneration is most
often sudden incapacity, disabling an individual without prior warn-
ings or symptoms. 37
Along with other airline industry associations, 38 the ALPA vigor-
ously opposed the Age 60 Rule. The ALPA contended: (1) that the
Administrator did not have the power to issue the proposed regulation;
(2) that the proposal violated due process of law; and (3) that the Fed-
eral Aviation Act itself prescribed the sole means by which the Admin-
istrator might limit, suspend, or revoke a pilot's certificate. 39 The
ALPA also questioned the validity of the medical basis upon which the
regulation was premised.40
In addition to these contentions, the ALPA argued that current
regulations already fulfilled the intent of the proposed regulations: pi-
lots were required to submit to FAA physical examinations every six
months that, if failed, resulted in license suspension;41 each pilot was
required to demonstrate flight proficiency every six months; 42 the Ad-ministrator was empowered to take emergency action to suspend a pi-
blood vessels. It is commonly termed "hardening of the arteries" and results when the walls
of blood vessels thicken and become infiltrated with excessive amounts of minerals and fatty
materials. This can be analogized to a pipe that accumulates calcium deposits on its interior
walls, thus reducing the flow of fluid and the flexibility of the tubing material. See THE
MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 381-82 (13th ed. 1977); VAN NOSTRAND'S
SCIENTIFIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 194 (5th ed. 1976).
35. 24 Fed. Reg. 5247 (1959).
36. Id
37. Id
38. The ALPA was joined by the Air Line Dispatchers Association, the Aircraft Own-
ers and Pilots Association, the National Business Aircraft Association, and the National
Aviation Trade Association. Ruppenthal, supra note 13, at 536.
39. .Airline Age Discriminaion, supra note 17, at 85.
40. Ruppenthal, supra note 13, at 535.
41. The physical examinations for the First Class Medical Certificate required for air-
line pilots are intended to detect functional changes and disorders that increase the risk of
sudden incapacitation or other conditions that might affect a pilot's physical fitness. The
examination primarily tests hearing, vision, and the cardiovascular, neurologic, and endo-
crine systems. DIvIsION OF HEALTH SCIENCES POLICY, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, AIRLINE
PILOT AGE, HEALTH AND PERFORMANCE 28 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PILOT AGE AND
HEALTH]; see generall, 14 C.F.R. §§ 67.1-.31 (1980).
42. A pilot's proficiency is continuously monitored by other flight crew members and is
examined at least once a year. There are, however, proficiency checks every six months
comprising simulator flights and line checks on regularly scheduled flights. See note 150
infra. A pilot is required to pass each check. If a check is failed, the pilot must undergo
additional training until he or she meets the minimum standards that are required by the
FAA for safe operations. PILOT AGE AND HEALTH, supra note 41, at 27; Proficiency Check
Requirements, 14 C.F.R. § 121.441 (1980).
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lot's certificate without a hearing if this result were warranted. 43
Furthermore, the ALPA indicated that through self-regulation individ-
ual airline carriers could adequately monitor pilot health. Manage-
ment could decide that a pilot was not competent or fit to fly and
should undergo further physical testing or proficiency training prior to
resuming flight status.44 Despite these arguments, the FAA promul-
gated the regulation, 45 and it became effective March 15, 1960.46
Administrative Review
The Age 60 Rule has twice been the subject of administrative re-
view by the FAA since its promulgation. 47 In each instance, however,
the Rule was held to be valid. The first review occurred in October
1971, when, in response to petitions filed by several pilots and the
ALPA requesting a public evidentiary hearing and the revocation of
the Rule, the FAA conducted informal hearings. 48 Subsequent to the
hearings, the Agency entered an order denying the requests for revoca-
tion on the "sound medical basis" that it lacked the ability "to deter-
mine the physiological and psychological age of individual pilots." '49
The second review occurred in 1977 as a result of FAA Adminis-
trator Langhorne Bond's promise at his Senate confirmation hearings
personally to review the Rule.5 0 Although the Administrator did not
change the Rule after his review, he did recognize that a change was
possible if a method were developed to ensure that a pilot's age did not
adversely affect health and ability.-"
43. Ruppenthal, supra note 13, at 535-36.
44. Id at 536.
45. The Rule was promulgated without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, as had
been requested by the ALPA, on the grounds that it would merely bring out information and
argument that had been presented in written comment and opinion. 24 Fed. Reg. 9768-69
(1959).
46. The Age 60 Rule was originally intended to take effect on December 1, 1959. The
Administrator, however, delayed the effective date to enable air carriers and the affected
pilots to prepare for compliance without unreasonable hardship. The ALPA contended that
such a delay negated any sincere concern for air safety on the part of the Administrator
because, had safety been the critical issue, the Administrator would have taken "emergency
action and grounded [the older pilots] immediately." Ruppenthal, supra note 13, at 543-44.
47. See Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893, 898 (2d Cir. 1979).
48. Airline Age Discrimination, supra note 17, at 86.
49. Id
50. Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893, 898 (2d Cir. 1979).
51. Administrator Bond forwarded the results of his review to several senators. He
commented in his review that he "could be satisfied that a proven scientific basis exists and a
feasible mechanism could be devised which could replace this rule while providing an
equivalent level of safety." Id
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Legal Challenges
Air Line Pilots Association International v. Quesada
Before the Rule came into effect, the ALPA initiated an action 52
seeking a preliminary injunction to suspend enforcement of the regula-
tion until its legality could be determined.53 In Air Line Pilots Associa-
tion International v. Quesada,54 the court of appeals upheld the validity
of the regulation, despite the ALPA's contention that the regulation
was invalid because it was arbitrary and discriminatory 55 and because
it was issued without an adjudicatory hearing,56 thereby depriving the
pilots of property rights in their licenses without due process of law.5 7
The ALPA contended that the FAA violated section 609 of the
Federal Aviation Act when it issued the regulation without a hearing,
because the FAA was actually modifying pilots' licenses, rather than
engaging in rulemaking. 58 The court held, however, that the procedure
was rulemaking and that the Administrative Procedures Act did not
require a hearing. 59 Moreover, the court indicated that the regulation
did not violate due process by modifying pilots' rights without a hear-
ing. "Administrative regulations often limit in the public interest the
use that persons may make of their property without affording each one
affected an opportunity to present evidence upon the fairness of the
regulation." 60 Any other interpretation, the court reasoned, would un-
duly hinder the Administrator's need to act quickly when the interests
of safety required action.61
In addition, the ALPA urged that the scheme of the Federal Avia-
tion Act showed a congressional intent to provide pilots the greater
protection of individual hearings before licenses could be modified.6 2
The court disagreed, however, stating that section 609 of the Act 63 de-
scribes modifications to an individual's certificate, and not to those of
all pilots." As such, the hearing required by the section does not apply
to the promulgation of rules affecting all pilots.
In response to the ALPA's allegation that the rule was arbitrary
52. The suit by the ALPA was initiated in January, 1960. Airline Age Discrimination,
supra note 17, at 85.
53. Ruppenthal, supra note 13, at 539.
54. 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1960).
55. 276 F.2d at 894.
56. Id at 895.
57. Id at 894.
58. Id at 895.
59. Id at 896.
60. Id
61. Id at 897.
62. Id
63. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 609, 49 U.S.C. § 1429 (1976).
64. 276 F.2d at 897.
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and discriminatory, the court ruled that the regulation had a reasonable
basis and was therefore neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. 65 Based
upon evidence presented by the FAA,66 the court found that the rule
did bear a reasonable relationship to safety. In addition, the court
found no unreasonable discrimination in the Rule's application, al-
though it applied only to pilots operating in air commerce. 67 By ad-
dressing only the power of the FAA to issue the regulation and the
manner in which the Rule was promulgated, the Quesada court
avoided the more difficult question of whether the Rule itself was justi-
fied as a safety measure.
Subsequent Litigation
Immediately after the failure of the ALPA's Quesada challenge,
the FAA began enforcement of the Age 60 Rule.68 Since its promulga-
tion, the Age 60 Rule has repeatedly been the subject of litigation. In
1974, the ALPA again sought to challenge the Age 60 Rule in
O'Donnell v. Shaffer.69 In that case, the ALPA attacked the validity of
informal FAA hearings conducted in October 1971 that had resulted in
the reaffirmation of the Age 60 Rule. 70 The ALPA argued that the
hearings violated procedural due process in that they were not eviden-
tiary and lacked the opportunity for cross-examination. 71 Arguing that
due process requires "trial by ordeal of cross-examination" 72 when the
determination of complex technical issues affects a pilot's livelihood,73
the ALPA contended that the complex technical issue involved in the
65. The court relied on the standard of review provided by statute, Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, § 601, 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1976), which required a showing that the Administra-
tor had no reasonable basis for the exercise of judgment. 276 F.2d at 898. See American
Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 314 (1953).
66. 276 F.2d at 898. The evidence presented by the FAA indicated that (1) the senior
pilots fly the largest and fastest aircraft; (2) the available medical studies show that incapaci-
tation due to heart attacks or strokes becomes more frequent in older persons; (3) the current
medical technology could not predict with accuracy when heart attacks or strokes might
occur; (4) several foreign air carriers had retirement rules paralleling the Age 60 Rule; and
(5) numerous experts advocate a maximum age of 60 or younger. Id See also Ruppenthal,
supra note 13, at 539-40.
67. 276 F.2d at 898. The court stated that "[tihe Federal Aviation Act contemplates
just such distinction between the regulations governing 'air commerce' and those governing
other air transportation." Id
68. The Age 60 Rule had become effective March 15, 1960, one month prior to
Quesada. 14 C.F.R. § 42.40(a) (1960).
69. 491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
70. Id at 61. See notes 48-49 & accompanying text supra.
71. 491 F.2d at 61.
72. Id at 62.
73. Id. Neither the Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976), nor the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 60, 49 U.S.C. § 609 (1976), provides for the right to cross-
examine during the rulemaking process.
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1971 hearings, whether current scientific evidence invalidated the
FAA's theory that medical science was unable to identify risks of pilot
incapacity on an individual basis,74 required the FAA to provide proce-
dural due process in its hearings. The court held, however, that an
evidentiary hearing was not required, regardless of the complexity of
the issues, 75 reasoning that the Age 60 Rule did not single out any pilot
in particular, but was rather an "across the board" regulation.76 Thus,
the Rule was "not subject to the requirements of adjudications simply
because of [its] inevitable effect on individuals. 77
Until 1978, the cases challenging the Age 60 Rule were directed at
the manner in which the Rule was promulgated and reviewed, and
were not directed at the justification for the Rule. The courts have con-
sistently and correctly held, however, that the FAA satisfied adminis-
trative and due process requirements in enacting the Rule.
In 1978, legal attacks against the Age 60 Rule changed focus as
individual pilots sought personal exemptions from the Rule. In Starr v.
FA,4,78 Captain John Starr, a United Airlines 747 pilot who had been
forced to retire under the Rule, sought review of the FAA's denial of an
exemption from the Rule.79 The issue on appeal was whether the FAA
had abused its discretion in denying all exemptions from the Rule.80
Starr contended that the facts showed that he was physically fit to fly,
and therefore that the denial of his exemption from the Rule was an
abuse of discretion.81
The court emphasized that its purpose was not to decide whether
Captain Starr was fit to fly or whether the Rule itself was valid.8 2
74. 491 F.2d at 61-62.
75. Id at 62.
76. Id
77. Id
78. 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978).
79. Captain Starr had filed a petition for an exemption, asserting that his physical con-
dition warranted such an exemption. Id at 309. In addition, Capt. Starr had sought to
disqualify the Federal Air Surgeon, Dr. H.L. Reighardt, on grounds of unalterable bias.
The record indicated, however, that the person who had made the decision under review was
not Dr. Reighardt, but rather was Mr. Scully of the Flight Standards Division of the FAA.
The court found that, even if Dr. Reighardt had been "disqualified" as the determining
physician, Mr. Scully might have been influenced by a document opposing a relaxation of
the Age 60 Rule that had been authored by Dr. Reighardt. Therefore, the court determined
that the failure to disqualify Dr. Reighardt was not prejudicial error. Id at 314-16.
80. The decision in Starr turned on an analysis of§ 601 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1421(c) (1976), which states: "The Secretary of Transportation from time to time
may grant exemptions from the requirements of any rule or regulation prescribed under this
subchapter if he finds that such action would be in the public interest."
81. The basis of Captain Starr's petition for exemption from the Age 60 Rule was that
his excellent health and the favorable results of various medical tests indicated that he
should have been granted an exemption. See 589 F.2d at 309, 311.
82. See id
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Rather, although the case concerned a single pilot, the real issue was
the Administrator's per se denial of all exemptions from the Rule. 83
Pursuant to this limited review, 84 the court found that the FAA had not
abused its discretion in denying Captain Starr's petition for exemption
from the Age 60 Rule.85 First, the court noted that an exemption need
not be granted merely because it was within the authority of the Ad-
ministrator to grant the exemption.8 6 Second, the court noted the diffi-
culties inherent in granting exemptions to a regulation such as the Age
60 Rule87 and suggested that it might be better to establish an explicit
policy of no exemptions under the Rule.88 Finally, the court stated that
in the future, it would not examine the issue of abuse of discretion8 9
absent a deliberate failure by the FAA to analyze new data 90 and
techniques.
In attempting to obtain review of his medical qualifications,91
Captain Starr relied on Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,92 in
which the court considered a pilot's physical fitness. In Houghton, the
plaintiff, aged 51, had been terminated from the position of senior test
pilot by McDonnell Douglas. McDonnell Douglas admitted that the
83. Id at 310.
84. The court reviewed the actions of the FAA under an "arbitrary and capricious"
and "abuse of discretion" standard. Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d at 310-11. The court indicated
that an "abuse of discretion" standard is normally applied when an agency is authorized to
take a particular action if found to be in the "public interest." Conceding that the Federal
Aviation Act requires review of findings of fact under a "substantial evidence" standard, 49
U.S.C. § 1486(e) (1976), the court defended the limited scope of its review by concluding
that "nonfactual analyses and agency conclusions drawn from facts are generally reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard." 589 F.2d at 310.
85. "[I]f the Age 60 Rule is reasonable, as it has been held to be, it is not abuse of
discretion to reject any individual application for exemption. . . . The court will defer to
. . . the FAA . . . even if on its own the court might have made different findings or
adopted different standards." Id at 312-13.
86. Id at 312.
87. The court stated that granting exemptions to a rule such as the Age 60 Rule would
severely burden the Flight Standards Service of the FAA. Furthermore, exemption deci-
sions would have to be based on voluminous medical records, which, according to the FAA,
do not determine the risks of heart attack or stroke. Finally, allowing exemptions would
create, rather than eliminate, anomalies and inequalities. Id
88. The court suggested that "[ilt might be better to publish a no-exemption policy for
the involved rule rather than leave a regulation on the books that seems to say exemption
from any rule can be petitioned for." Id The benefits of such a policy include: (1) notice of
the administrative hurdle to potential petitioners prior to their investment of time and
money; (2) establishment of a standard to prevent ad hoc judgments based on trifling differ-
ences; and (3) elimination of the need for timely considerations of each individual petition
for exemption. Id
89. Id at 312.
90. For arguments that the FAA is deliberately not analyzing new medical data, see
generally Aviation Hearings, supra note 2, at 104-11 (statement of Dr. Stanley Mohler).
91. 589 F.2d at 309.
92. 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
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plaintiff had been terminated due to his age, but contended that age
was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA)93 and was therefore a permis-
sible basis for termination. 94 The plaintiff presented considerable
medical evidence showing that he was in excellent health.95 Although
the district court ruled against Houghton and held that age was a
BFOQ,96 the Eighth Circuit, on appeal, held that McDonnell Douglas
failed to present sufficient evidence that Houghton's age was a
BFOQ.97 The Eighth Circuit thus ordered the district court to require
the defendant to provide back pay, and to reinstate Houghton if he was
still qualified.98
By rejecting the contention that age is a BFOQ, therefore disallow-
ing termination based on age, Houghton provides support for the con-
tention that the Age 60 Rule is not valid. Houghton's application to the
Age 60 Rule may be distinguished, however, on three grounds: (1) the
plaintiff in Houghton was not 60 years old, but was only 51; thus, the
Age 60 Rule and its rationales99 would not apply to the plaintifl (2)
Houghton was brought under the ADEA, °° which is applicable to em-
ployers, but not to federal agencies,' 0' and is therefore an employment
discrimination case rather than a direct challenge to the Rule; and (3)
the plaintiff did not fly aircraft carrying passengers, but rather flew test
93. A bona fide occupational qualification is a factor that an employer deems a require-
ment for a job. Under the ADEA, an employer may refuse without penalty to hire or termi-
nate an employee due to age if age is a BFOQ. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976). See generally
Rosenblum, Age Discrimination in Employment and the Permissibility of Occupational Age
Restrictions, 32 HASTINoS LJ. 1261 (1981).
94. 553 F.2d at 564.
95. Id at 563.
96. Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 413 F. Supp. 1230, 1239 (E.D. Mo. 1976),
rev'd, 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
97. 553 F.2d at 564. In fact, the court held that the district court's findings that age
constituted a BFOQ for Houghton were "clearly erroneous." Id
98. See id at 565. On remand, the district court heard additional evidence regarding
Houghton's fitness and found that he was not qualified. As a result, the court denied
Houghton all back pay and his return to test flight duty. Houghton brought a third appeal,
alleging that the district court failed to abide by the law of the case. The Eighth Circuit
agreed and ordered the defendant to provide back pay for the period beginning with Hough-
ton's termination and ending with the last physical he had, upon which evidence the court
had ruled he was fit to fly. The court also said his fitness to fly past that date was open to
examination. Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 627 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1980).
99. See text accompanying notes 33-37 supra.
100. 413 F. Supp. 1230, 1231 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
101. Bergman, Age Discrimination in Employment: Air Carriers, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 3,
19 (1970). In 1968, however, the Labor Department issued an order that interpreted § 4(f)(I)
of the Act, establishing the Age 60 Rule as a BFOQ. 33 Fed. Reg. 9172 (1968) (to be codi-
fied in 29 C.F.R. § 860.102). This interpretation and order would appear to protect only air
carriers from suit under the ADEA. Thus, it would not support the FAA's position on the
Rule.
September 1981] AGE 60 RETIREMENT RULE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
aircraft; thus, the state of his health did not place passengers in
jeopardy.
Within two years of Houghton, three other circuits decided cases
involving issues similar to those presented in Starr.10 2 In Rombough v.
FAA,103 the Second Circuit held that the FAA could not deny on its
face an exemption from the Age 60 Rule,' 04 but did not invalidate the
Rule. The basis of the Rombough court's decision was that the FAA
was unable to determine an individual pilot's functional age, and that
the plaintiff had failed to show that his proposed standards of fitness
provided the public with a sufficient level of safety. 0 5
In finding no reliable physical or psychological tests to warrant
invalidating the Age 60 Rule, the Rombough court relied on Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc.10 6 In Hodgson, the defendant's refusal to hire
drivers older than age 35 was sustained because of the potential danger
of accidents from driver error. The Rombough court relied on Hodgson
for the proposition that changes due to age cannot be tested reliably
enough to warrant the safety risk inherent in hiring an older em-
ployee. 10 7 The Rombough court's reliance on Hodgson, however, is
misplaced. First, the Hodgson court considered the use of age as a fac-
tor in hiring employees, not in retiring them. This distinction is impor-
tant because, in retiring an employee, an employer takes away a vested
interest in the job, while, in refusing to hire an employee, an employer
merely withholds the job from one who does not yet have it. Second,
whereas in Hodgson the court found that Greyhound lacked the ability
to predict the health of drivers past the age of 35, the FAA has clearly
demonstrated its ability accurately to predict health changes in younger
pilots. 0 8 The FAA, however, claims a lesser degree of accuracy in pre-
dicting health changes in pilots past the age of 60.109 Thus, the ability
102. Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1979); Keating v. FAA, 610 F.2d 611 (9th
Cir. 1979); Gray v. FAA, 594 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1979).
103. 594 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1979).
104. 594 F.2d at.
105. Id. at 897, 899. Furthermore, while the court stated that the Rule had "survived a
number of challenges on both procedural and substantive grounds," id at 898 (emphasis
added), previous cases were based on whether the Rule was properly enacted and not on
whether the Rule was warranted. See note 165 & accompanying text infra.
106. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. deniedsub nom., Brennan v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). The court also cited with approval Usery v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
107. The Rombough court stated that "[o]ther courts faced with the issue have specifi-
cally found that psychological and physiological changes due to age cannot be tested with
sufficient reliability to justify the safety risks involved in employing older applicants in jobs
where their performance may jeopardize people's safety." 594 F.2d at 899.
108. Aviation Hearings, supra note 2, at 38-39 (statement of Dr. H.L. Reighardt). In
addition, the FAA is capable of recertifying pilots who have been heart patients. Starr v.
FAA, 589 F.2d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 1978).
109. Aviation Hearings, supra note 2, at 32, 35.
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of the FAA to predict health changes is greater than that of the defend-
ant in Hodgson, although the FAA's claimed ability is not great enough
to invalidate the Age 60 Rule. Third, Hodgson involved a bus driven
by only one person, while an aircraft has at least two pilots, both of
whom are certified to pilot the aircraft, 110 and generally a third
crewmember who may fill in to relieve one of the other pilots if he or
she becomes incapacitated."' Thus, there are more safeguards on an
airplane than on a bus.
Soon after Rombough, the Tenth Circuit, in Gray v. FA, ,112 af-
firmed the FAA's denial of the plaintiffs request for an exemption
from the Age 60 Rule. In a break with precedent, however, the Gray
court indicated that, in the future, the FAA may be considered to "be
capable of abusing its discretion by adhering to its policy of nonexemp-
tion from the Age 60 Rule." 113 Nevertheless, noting that medical au-
thority on the subject of aging is far from unanimous, the court stated
that until the authority becomes stronger, the policy of the FAA could
not be termed an abuse of discretion.' 4
Recently, the Ninth Circuit, in Keating v. FA!A!,1 5 found that the
FAA did not abuse its discretion by denying Captain Keating's exemp-
tion from the Age 60 Rule. 16 Captain Keating was denied an exemp-
tion from the Age 60 Rule and subsequently brought suit, contending
that the FAA's action was an arbitrary abuse of discretion. 117
Captain Keating's approach differed from the previously discussed
"exemption cases""" because he challenged the manner in which his
petition was denied, rather than raising the issue of whether the FAA
may per se deny all such petitions. While holding that the FAA's de-
nial of Captain Keating's exemption was not an abuse of discretion, the
Keating court left open the possibility that a court may find that the
FAA abuses its discretion by adopting a policy of per se denial of ex-
emptions. The FAA argued in Keating that Captain Keating had
failed to provide two types of medical tests that the FAA deemed nec-
essary in order to grant an exemption." 9 Stating that it was not an
110. Crewmember Qualifications, 14 C.F.R. § 121.432(a) (1980).
111. See note 160 infra.
112. 594 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1979).
113. Id at 795.
114. Id
115. 610 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1979).
116. Id. at 613.
117. Id at 613. Capt. Keating relied on 14 C.F.R. § 11.25(b)(5) (1980), which requires
that exemptions from the Federal Aviation Regulations be in the public interest, that they
not adversely affect safety, and that there be a continued level of safety equal to that pro-
vided by the Rule.
118. See notes 52-114 & accompanying text supra.
119. The two tests identified by the FAA were angiographic studies and psychophysio-
logical functions tests. An angiography is a test through which it is possible to determine
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expert in aerospace medicine, the court of appeals deferred to the
FAA.120 This deference suggests that, had Captain Keating provided
the tests required by the FAA, the court may have been more willing to
find an abuse of discretion.
Although the cases since Quesada have upheld the validity of the
procedures used in enacting the Age 60 Rule, the recent cases involving
the validity of the FAA's denial of exemptions from the Rule indicate a
recognition by the courts that the FAA's "no exemption policy" may
result in a finding of abuse of discretion. This recognition is reflected
in the response of the Tenth Circuit in Gray to the FAA's failure to
heed medical science, and more significantly, in the Keating court's
possible willingness to find an abuse of discretion by the FAA had the
plaintiff provided the results of the medical tests.
Legislative Reform
The controversy surrounding the Age 60 Rule peaked in 1979,
when a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives' 2' to
amend section 602(b) of the Federal Aviation Act 22 to eliminate all
age limitations imposed on air carrier pilots.
In addition to prohibiting federal officers and the airlines from re-
fusing pilots over sixty the right to fly, the proposed bill called for an
increased number of more stringent physical examinations if deemed
necessary by the Secretary of Transportation. 23 The bill also directed
the National Institute of Health (NIH) to determine whether any
mandatory age limitation for pilots was needed and whether physical
examination standards were adequate. 124
abnormalities in the circulatory system by injecting a contrast material into the arteries,
veins, or heart and then viewing its progress through radiological techniques. THE MERCK
MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 371 (13th ed. 1977).
120. 610 F.2d at 613.
121. See note 124 & accompanying text infra.
122. Codfiedat 49 U.S.C. § 1422(b) (1970). The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 602(b),
49 U.S.C. § 1422(b) (1970).
123. See note 124 infra.
124. The bill was entitled The Experienced Pilots Act of 1979 and will be referred to as
such in this Note. The bill read in pertinent part: "(2) Notwithstanding any other provision
of law or any rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant thereto, no Federal officer or em-
ployee shall-(A) refuse to issue any airman certificate to, or refuse to renew any airman
certificate for, any person applying for the issuance or renewal of such certificate in order to
serve or continue to serve as a pilot of any aircraft; or (B) require any air carrier to terminate
the employment of, or refuse to employ, such person as a pilot on any aircraft of such air
carrier;, solely by reason of the age of such person, if such person is less than seventy years of
age. (3) If the Secretary of Transportation determines on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing that in the interest of safety persons who are sixty years of age or older and
are employed as pilots by air carriers to which the regulation set forth in part 121.383(c) of
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, applied prior to the date of enactment of this para-
graph should be required-(A) to pass more frequent medical examinations than persons
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Following the introduction of this bill, the Subcommittee on Avia-
tion of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation held hear-
ings in July 1979.125 As a result of these hearings, the original bill was
modified extensively.' 26 As modified, the bill permitted pilots to con-
tinue working until the age of sixty-one and one half, or until a study
to be undertaken by the NIH demonstrated that pilots should retire at
an earlier age. The bill also required the NIH to conduct a study to
determine whether the Age 60 Rule-or any age limit-is warranted,
whether current FAA medical examinations are adequate, and the ef-
fect of aging on a pilot's abilities to perform his or her duties. Further-
more, the new law was extended to pilots not presently subject to the
Rule, that is, commuter airline pilots, air carrier helicopter pilots, and
air travel club pilots.127
In response to these changes in the bill, many advocates of a
change in the Age 60 Rule voiced their opposition to the bill reported
out of committee. 128 One opponent of the bill was the ALPA, which
reported that the proposed law was "unacceptable to the total member-
who are less than sixty years of age and employed as such pilots, or (B) to pass more com-
prehensive medical examinations than persons who are less than sixty years of age and em-
ployed as such pilots, the Secretary, by regulation, may require such persons who are sixty
years of age or older to pass more frequent or more comprehensive medical examinations in
order to continue to serve as such pilots, except that in no case shall the Secretary require
that such persons pass such examinations less frequently than four times a year or within
ninety days of actual flight. Sec. 2. The Director of the National Institute of Health, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Labor, shall conduct
a study to review available medical data to determine whether an age limitation which pro-
hibits individuals who are older than a particular age from serving as pilots of aircraft is
medically warranted. Not later than January 1, 1982, the Director of the National Institute
of Health shall submit a Report to the Congress which sets forth the results of such Study."
H.R. 3948, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 2722 (1979).
The proposed bill was broader than necessary. Rather than simply altering the age
requirement rules for senior pilots, it would have applied retirement rules to pilots engaged
in charter, helicopter, and travel club operations, and required a review of the current physi-
cal examination process for all classes of pilots. See COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND
TRANSPORTATION, EXPERIENCED PILOTS ACT OF 1979, H.R. REP. No. 96-474, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess., reprintedin [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2613.
125. Witnesses at the hearing included members from the House of Representatives,
retired and active pilots, physicians representing both sides of the controversy, airline execu-
tives, former astronauts, and representatives from the FAA. The wide-ranging testimony
included contradictory medical evidence as well as disagreements about an older pilot's abil-
ity. See generally,4viation Hearings, supra note 2. The Committee prepared a report based
on the testimony and, on a vote of twenty-seven in favor to nineteen opposed, delivered it to
Congress on September 25, 1979. COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION,
EXPERIENCED PILOTS ACT OF 1979, H.R. REp. No. 96-474, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin
[1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2613, 2620.
126. 4viation Hearings, supra note 2, at 5-7.
127. Id
128. Telephone interview with Capt. Jack Young, Eastern Airlines, Legislative Vice
President, Pilots' Rights Ass'n (Oct. 20, 1980).
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ship of ALPA."'129 The bases of the ALPA's opposition were that: (1)
the bill included an arbitrary age limit of sixty-one and one half;130 (2)
it did not apply equally to all flight deck crewmembers 131 because it did
not apply to flight engineers; 132 (3) the proposed eighteen month exten-
sion would interfere with existing contracts and pension plan rights; 33
(4) the law did not prohibit the FAA from imposing more demanding
or frequent physical examinations on other pilots; 134 and (5) in the ab-
sence of medical evidence, any upper age limit was unjustified. 135
As a result of this opposition to the proposed law, an amendment
to the proposed bill was suggested.136 This amendment, known as the
Howard Amendment, 37 essentially deleted all provisions of the pro-
posed bill except those directing the NIH to conduct a study into the
medical aspects of aging and flying. The Howard Amendment was
enacted, in lieu of the originally proposed bill, on December 29,
1979.138
129. Airline Pilots' Ass'n, News Release 79.26 (Aug. 2, 1979).
130. Id.
131. Aviation Hearings, supra note 2, at 343 (statement of Capt. O'Donnell).
132. There is some question about whether a flight engineer is a "pilot" and therefore
covered by the Age 60 Rule. In Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 79 C 360 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 30, 1979), the court held that a flight engineer is a pilot for the purposes of the Age 60
Rule. Some carriers, however, will permit a captain to make a bid for a flight engineer
position prior to his or her 60th birthday and then, when the captain reaches 60, will not
retire him or her because the carriers do not extend the Rule to flight engineers. Interview
with Robert Leonard, Captain, Pan American World Airways, retired, San Jose, California
(May 1, 1981). As a result, it is unclear whether the Age 60 Rule applies to flight engineers,
although it would seem that the FAA would not require flight engineers to relinquish their
jobs because they do not actually fly the airplane. See 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1980).
133. Air Line Pilots' Ass'n, News Release 79.26 (Aug. 2, 1979).
134. Aviation Hearings, supra note 2, at 343 (statement of Capt. O'Donnell).
135. Id
136. See note 137 infra.
137. 127 CONG. REC. H 1,554 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1979). Following the introduction of
the Howard Amendment, there was substantial debate on the floor of the House. Some
Representatives argued that allowing pilots to continue flying past the age of 60 while the
NIH conducted its study was tantamount to using the flying public as guinea pigs. Id at
11,550. Others argued that arbitrary limits serve political convenience rather than safety.
Id at 11,558. Finally, it was pointed out that the current regulation discriminates unfairly
against airline pilots. Id at 11,559.
138. Mandatory Age Retirement-Pilots, Pub. L. No. 96-171, 93 Stat. 1285 (1979). Al-
though the law calls for the completion of the study within one year of enactment, the study
has yet to be produced. The NIH contracted with the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the
National Academy of Sciences to compile available medical data and its findings. Letter
from Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services, to Congressman Thomas
P. O'Neill, Jr. (Sept. 17, 1980) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
However, it has become clear that due to the "complexity of the study and the need to
prepare a thorough, objectively analytical and in-depth report," id, the results will not be
presented to the Congress until the fall of 1981, almost one year behind schedule. This delay
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Lack of Justification for the Age 60 Rule
An alternative to the Age 60 Rule's absolute prohibition of pilots
over the age of sixty should be developed to avoid the removal from
duty of experienced, skilled pilots at age sixty without regard to each
individual pilot's state of health. 39 As the preliminary report of the
Institute of Medicine noted, the age of sixty "does not mark the begin-
ning of a special risk or a special increase in risk."'140
Proponents of mandatory age-based retirement argue that the sys-
tem is needed to ensure passenger safety because medical science is
presently unable to predict and measure physical and mental degenera-
tion caused by aging.' 41 Medical researchers assert, however, that age
alone has little predictive or diagnostic value with respect to functional
and cognitive deficiencies of pilots. Because "[alging is a [process]
characterized by adaptation or maladaptation to the environment...
[t]he simple notion of deficit as either a descriptive or an explanatory
variable for change in an older person is not legitimate."' 42 An indi-
vidual's functional and cognitive deficiencies cannot be attributed
solely to age with complete reliability until the individual is in his or
her late eighties. More reliable indications of functional and cognitive
decline include histories of cardiovascular disease and central nervous
system disorders. 143 In addition, Dr. Stanley Mohler is of the opinion
that "[a]ge alone, as is the case with race or sex, gives no information
about an individual's competency or health." 144 According to Dr.
Mohler, the three critical determinants of pilot fitness are: (1) freedom
from an impairing disease; (2) the.ability to perform; and (3) the desire
to continue flying.145
is indeed unfortunate for those pilots who have been anticipating the results of the NIH
study.
The report of the IOM was completed in March 1981, PILOT AGE AND HEALTH, supra
note 41, and copies were made available to interested parties so that they might submit
comments at any of three hearings held by the National Institute on Aging (NIA) in April,
May, and June, 1981. The NIA drafted a report during the summer for the Department of
Health and Human Services, which submitted the report to Congress on September 30, 1981.
Telephone interviews with Ann Dieffenback, National Institute on Aging (Apr. 21, 1981),
and Dr. Robert L. Ringler, Deputy Director, National Institute on Aging (Aug. 26, 1981).
139. By retiring pilots at age 60, the Rule becomes unrealistic and detrimental to passen-
ger safety. Stanley R. Mohler, M.D., The Aging Process, Diseases, and Pilot Career Longev-
ity 16-17 (Sept. 11, 1980) (Presented at the 28th Int'l Congress of Aviation and Space
Medicine, Montreal, Quebec, Canada) [hereinafter cited as Mohler]. It has been demon-
strated that, as a pilot's age and experience increase, accident rates decrease. Id at 19.
140. PILOT AGE AND HEALTH, supra note 41, at 3.
141. See generall Aviation Hearings, supra note 2, at 30-104 & 218-329.
142. Aviation Hearings, supra note 2, at 100 (statement of Dr. Donna Cohen of the Uni-
versity of Washington).
143. Id at 103.
144. Mohler, supra note 139, at 2.
145. Id
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With respect to the first criterion, while it is evident that the Age
60 Rule was designed in part to obviate the increased threat of heart
attack in older pilots, 146 recent medical research indicates that heart
problems can be reliably predicted prior to a heart attack, even in older
pilots.147 Thus, the primary impairing disease, heart attack, may be
predicted with some accuracy. 48
In addition to being free from impairing disease, a pilot must be
able to perform. 149 Proponents of the Age 60 Rule argue that pilots
past the age of sixty lose some of their skill and thereby present a
greater danger to the public. Ability to pilot an aircraft, however, does
not necessarily decrease as a pilot's age increases. Many pilots above
the age of sixty have greater skill and experience than their younger
colleagues. ' 50
Recent technological advances in flight simulators facilitate the
testing of a pilot's ability to perform. Thus, the argument that the air-
lines cannot accurately detect the deterioration of skills in older pilots
loses force in light of the advances in simulator technology. Air carrier
pilots must currently pass a proficiency flight check every six months.'s'
146. See notes 32-37 & accompanying text supra.
147. Mohler, supra note 139, at 15.
Dr. Robert Bruce, Professor of Medicine at the University of Washington, has devel-
oped a procedure, called the Bruce protocol, Aviation Hearings, supra note 2, at 89, with
which it is possible to predict the likelihood of heart attack in an individual during a six-
month to five-year period. Mohler, supra note 139, at 15. The FAA uses a similar method
of "stress testing" when it recertifies pilots who have been grounded due to coronary disease.
Aviation Hearings, supra note 2, at 96. However, the FAA refuses to use this form of testing
to evaluate pilots over the age of 60, id, notwithstanding Dr. Bruce's opinion that, "[tihere is
simply no medical or scientific evidence to show that these techniques lose their validity at
any particular chronological age." Id
148. Predictive testing is based on detection of the following four risk indicators: 1)
positive family history of cardiovascular disease, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, and
cigarette smoking; 2) ischemic ST depression; 3) chest pain; and 4) duration of exercise of
less than six minutes. The last three risk factors are determined with symptom-limited
treadmill testing of maximal exercise (the Bruce protocol). According to Dr. Bruce, the risk
of coronary heart disease in men 55-69 years of age who have less than two of the above
predictors is less than 7% per year. Of this possible group of people, less than one out of five
cardiac events is fatal. Aviation Hearings, supra note 2, at 91-93. See also Bruce, DeRouen
& Hossack, Value of Maximal Exercise Tests in Risk Assessment of Primary Coronary Heart
Disease Events in Healthy Men, Five Years' Experience of the Seattle Heart Watch Study, 46
AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 371 (Sept. 1980); Harrison & Smith, Age Trends in the Cardiovascular
Dynamics of Aircrewmen, 50 Av. SPACE & ENVT'L MED. 271 (March 1979).
149. See note 145 & accompanying text supra.
150. Mohler, supra note 139, at 18.
When a senior pilot is retired, not only have the services of a highly trained pilot been
lost, but as many as twenty additional pilots must be trained to fill the vacancies created by
the progressive openings throughout the seniority list that a vacancy at the top of the list
causes. Telephone interview with Grammar Foster, Ass't Vice President of Flight Opera-
tions, Republic Airlines (Oct. 14, 1980).
151. 14 C.F.R. § 121.441 (1980).
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As a result of the increased sophistication of simulators, the FAA has
amended the regulations governing the use of simulators in proficiency
testing, making it possible for pilots to perform their required flight
checks in a simulator rather than in an aircraft. 5 2 If an older pilot can
handle the myriad of complex emergencies generated by a simulator as
well as, or better than, younger pilots, then it is difficult to argue that
the older pilot cannot react with the speed and accuracy of a younger
pilot, or that the older pilot does not fly as well as a younger pilot.
Under Dr. Mohler's test, the fitness to fly finally requires the desire
to continue flying. 15 3 Although many pilots look forward to retire-
ment,' 54 others desire to continue piloting subsequent to reaching the
mandatory retirement age. An option preferable to the forced retire-
ment imposed by the Age 60 Rule would be to give an airline pilot the
choice to continue his or her career or to retire.
In light of the above, it is evident that the three prerequisites of the
fitness to fly, as established by Dr. Mohler,155 can be satisfied by the
present state of the art. Not only can medical science detect the pres-
ence of impairing disease, but with the use of sophisticated simulators,
the airlines can reliably detect any significant deterioration in the skill
of pilots. Allowing pilots to fly after age sixty presumes their desire to
continue piloting; those pilots who wish to retire upon reaching age
sixty should still be able to do so. Accordingly, justifications for the
Age 60 Rule no longer outweigh the evils prescribed by the Rule; 56 the
Age 60 Rule can be amended with no diminution in passenger safety.
Alternate Solution
The Age 60 Rule should be repealed in its entirety. Although the
repeal of the Rule arguably is the only action necessary to cure the
drawbacks of the Age 60 Rule, because the current recertification pro-
152. Training Program: Approval of airplane simulators and other training devices, 14
C.F.R. § 121.407 (1980).
It has been argued that simulators do not adequately test an individual's flight profi-
ciency because they are only imitations of real life. 45 Fed. Reg. 44182 (1980). However, in
amending the regulations pertaining to simulator use, the FAA noted that self esteem, peer
pressure, and the fact that failure to pass a simulator proficiency test is grounds for revoking
a pilot's certificate provide more than enough psychological pressure to counter any compla-
cency that might develop due to a simulated environment. Id
153. See note 145 & accompanying text supra.
154. Morgan, FLYING, Feb. 1981, at 24.
155. See note 145 & accompanying text supra.
156. The airline industry is generally opposed to changing the Age 60 Rule. 4viation
Hearings, supra note 2, at 218-19. Although all opponents to change premise their conclu-
sions on concerns for safety, other possible motives include wage negotiation leverage by
unions, career advancement for younger pilots, avoidance of the considerable costs to the
government of changing the Rule, and a natural resistance to change. Mohler, supra note
139, at 23.
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cess removes unqualified pilots from command, 57 it is apparent that
the elimination of age-based retirement, without more, would not sat-
isfy Congress or the FAA. Therefore, a change in regulations must be
accompanied by additional safeguards. 5 8
If the Age 60 Rule were repealed, air carrier pilots who have
reached the age of sixty should be required to submit to more frequent
FAA medical examinations, including tests similar to the Bruce proto-
col.' 59 These examinations should take place at least every three
months, twice as often as currently required. In addition, pilots who
have reached the age of sixty should be required to take simulator pro-
ficiency checks more frequently. By requiring increased frequency in
both types of testing, a sudden onset of disease or a decline in profi-
ciency could be quickly detected. As an additional benefit, increased
testing would produce more complete information regarding a pilot's
health and proficiency than is currently available for the study of
trends of health and performance in older pilots. 60
To avoid many of the pitfalls encountered by the proposed Exper-
ienced Pilots Act of 1979, which the House of Representatives re-j ected, 6 1 a suggested alternative to the Age 60 Rule should have a
more limited application. Thus, this alternative should involve only
those pilots who have reached the age of sixty, imposing no additional
requirements or testing on younger pilots. Additionally, by applying to
all flight deck crew members, it should avoid all differentiation be-
tween the piloting positions of captain and copilot, and the support po-
157. See note 44 & accompanying text supra.
158. These limitations are only suggested as a means of countering any opposition to the
proposal advocated by this Note and are not to be construed as acknowledging any frailties
of older pilots.
159. See notes 148-50 & accompanying text supra.
160. As a practical matter, it may be necessary to impose several other limitations on
pilots over the age of 60. For example, in order to appease the fears of those concerned
about having an entire flight crew of pilots over 60 years old, it might be necessary to require
that no more than one member of a flight crew be over the age of 60. As a temporary
measure, it may be necessary to bar pilots over 60 from serving on the flight crews of current
production aircraft requiring only two crewmembers because, although such aircraft are
capable of being flown by a single pilot in an emergency, too much of a workload fals upon
the remaining pilot when one becomes incapacitated. Recently, however, the President's
Task Force on Aircraft Crew Complement concluded that new, highly sophisticated aircraft
such as the Douglas DC-9-80 and the Boeing 757 and 767 can be operated safely by two
crewmembers. Report of the President's Task Force on Aircraft Crew Complement (July 2,
1981). In light of the possible reduced crew complement, there would be no age limitation
with respect to the new generation of aircraft.
Finally, if medical evidence indicates that older pilots have reduced stamina, it might
be necessary to apply a variegated maximum hours per flight standard that would assign
older pilots a more protective standard than the current eight-hour maximum. See 14
C.F.R. § 121.471(b) (1980).
161. See note 128-35 & accompanying text supra.
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sitions of flight engineer and navigator.162 Finally, it should apply only
to those pilots currently subject to the Age 60 Rule, excluding those not
currently covered.163
Conclusion
Since 1960, the FAA has required airline pilots to retire when they
reach the age of sixty. The requirements of the Age 60 Rule have been
termed arbitrary and discriminatory by opponents of the Rule. Never-
theless, the FAA remains convinced that the Rule is justified and neces-
sary and, as a result, has refused to change the Rule or grant any
exemptions from it.'"
The courts have upheld the manner in which the Rule was
promulgated and affirmed the position of the FAA in its refusal to
grant exemptions from it. Despite this judicial acceptance, the courts
have not ruled on the issue of whether the Rule is itself warranted, but
have deferred judgment on that issue to the FAA. 165
Due to recent advances in medical science and simulator technol-
ogy, however, it is now possible to determine the likelihood of whether
a pilot will suffer an incapacitating disease and test his or her abilities
as a pilot. In addition to these advances, recent court opinions in Gray
and Keating suggesting judicial displeasure with the FAA's blanket de-
nial of all exemptions of the Rule 66 indicate that the Age 60 Rule
should be abolished.
Repealing the Rule will allow pilots to continue their careers until
they choose to retire or are no longer qualified to fly. By subjecting
pilots over the age of sixty to more frequent physical examinations and
flight proficiency checks, the FAA and the airlines will be able to en-
sure that pilots maintain their health and their flight skills, and, even
more importantly, that the nation's air travelers will be flying with the
most experienced pilots in the aviation industry.
A Michael Kasfperzak, Jr. *
162. See note 132 supra.
163. There are currently no regulations that require pilots in other operations, such as
air taxi, commuter, travel club, personal, or helicopter, to retire at a specified age. However,
as a result of several recent commuter airline accidents, the National Transportation Safety
Board has made a formal recommendation to the Administrator that an upper age limit be
specified for commuter pilots. No rulemaking process has been initiated to date. National
Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation A-80-36 & 37 (1980). See also note
16 supra.
164. See notes 78-120 & accompanying text supra.
165. Air Line Pilots' Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
962, rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 870 (1961).
166. See notes 119-20 & accompanying text supra.
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